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The Cisplatine War was an armed conflict fought in the 1820s between the Empire of Brazil and the United Provinces of the Río de la Plata over control of Brazil's Cisplatina province. It was fought in the aftermath of the United Provinces' and Brazil's independence from Spain and Portugal, respectively, and resulted in the independence of Cisplatina as the Uruguay.
In 1816, the United Kingdom of Portugal, Brazil and the Algarves carried out an invasion of the Banda Oriental and, after defeating the local resistance led by José Gervasio Artigas, annexed it under the name of Cisplatina. After Brazil's independence in 1822, Cisplatina remained as part of Brazil. Wishing to gain control of the region, the United Provinces sent a diplomatic mission to Brazil in 1823 to negotiate a peaceful Brazilian withdrawal, but it failed. In 1825, a group of patriots known as the Thirty-Three Orientals, supported by the Argentine government and led by Juan Antonio Lavalleja, launched a rebellion against Brazil. On 25 August of that year, in the Congress of Florida, they declared Cisplatina's independence from Brazil and its unification with the United Provinces. After a series of initial skirmishes, they defeated the Brazilians at the battles of Rincón and Sarandí, prompting the Argentine Congress to proclaim Cisplatina reintegrated into the United Provinces on 25 October. In response, Brazil declared war on the United Provinces on 10 December 1825 and imposed a naval blockade on the River Plate.
The United Provinces managed to occupy the Uruguayan countryside with the help of the local insurgents, however, its forces never managed to capture Montevideo and Colonia del Sacramento or penetrate deeply into Brazilian territory. Likewise, the Brazilians did not manage to regain control of the countryside or achieve a decisive victory in order to repel the Argentines, with both armies clashing at the battle of Ituzaingó, the largest battle of the conflict. Thus, the war on land reached an impasse. At sea, however, the Brazilian Navy obtained better results, despite the Argentine resistance, whose small fleet, led by Irish-born admiral William Brown, was mostly destroyed.
The economic burden and internal political disputes caused by the war in both states, especially the Brazilian naval blockade and the impasse on land, led both countries to start peace negotiations. In 1827, the Argentine minister plenipotentiary Manuel José García signed a peace treaty with Brazilian representatives, recognizing Brazil's sovereignty over Cisplatina and agreeing to pay Brazil a war indemnity. The treaty was rejected by Argentine president Bernardino Rivadavia, but its terms generated enormous backlash forcing the president to present his resignation. Manuel Dorrego was then elected to succeed him and continue the war. The conflict continued until 27 August 1828, when Argentine and Brazilian representatives, under British mediation, signed the Preliminary Peace Convention of 1828, by which Cisplatina would become an independent state and hostilities would cease.
After the war, tensions in Argentina between the Federalists and the Unitarian Party increased. Manuel Dorrego, a Federalist, was deposed and executed by Juan Lavalle and the country fell into a civil war. In Brazil, the war's financial cost, aggravated by the damage done to Brazilian trade by Argentine corsairs, and the loss of Cisplatina, added to the internal political disputes surrounding emperor Pedro I, which ultimately led him to abdicate the throne in favour of his 5-year-old son Pedro II in 1831, ushering the regency period.
The Spaniards, wishing to solidify their control over the region, also founded a colony on the opposite bank of the river in 1724, when Bruno Mauricio de Zabala founded the town of Montevideo. After centuries of wars and settling attempts between the two empires, Colônia do Sacramento finally became a Spanish possession by the 1801 Treaty of Badajoz.
With the outbreak of the 1810 May Revolution in Buenos Aires and the Argentine struggle for independence that ensued, Montevideo, under the command of viceroy Francisco Javier de Elío, remained loyal to Spain. The Primera Junta of Buenos Aires then set out to subdue Montevideo and Elío, who, finding himself without support from Europe, requested assistance from Carlota Joaquina, the Spanish wife of Portuguese prince regent John of Braganza. The Portuguese crown, which had fled to Brazil in 1808 after the French invasion of Portugal, then took the opportunity to invade the Banda Oriental in 1811. An army named "Peacekeeping Army of the Banda Oriental" was assembled and command was given to , who had orders to help Elío. Diogo de Sousa then led the troops into the Banda Oriental, but a few months later, on 20 October 1811, Elío signed the Treaty of Pacification with the First Triumvirate, which had succeeded the Primera Junta, and so the Argentines, led by José Rondeau, lifted the siege on Montevideo and left the Banda Oriental. Likewise, the Portuguese signed an armistice with Buenos Aires on 26 May 1812 and also left the region.
In this struggle for control over the region, José Gervasio Artigas, a native of the Banda Oriental who had defeated the Spanish at the battle of Las Piedras in 1811, opposed the treaty; Artigas left the Banda Oriental with 16 thousand people, in what became known as the , and continued to fight against Spanish rule. In 1814, Artigas, who had fought for independence alongside Buenos Aires troops since 1810, finally defeated the last Spanish forces in the region. Despite receiving military assistance from Buenos Aires in the independence war, Artigas opposed the Buenos Aires elites' intention of centralizing power and resisted their attempts to take control of the Banda Oriental, defeating Manuel Dorrego at the in 1815 and forming the League of the Free Peoples. This league was based on federalism and social reform, which gained him the support of the poor peoples of the countryside; thus, Artigas became an obstacle to Buenos Aires' political ambitions.
Artigas also opposed Portuguese intentions of asserting control over the region, and attacked the neighboring Brazilian province of Rio Grande do Sul near Quaraí. His influence was also felt in the north, inhabited by Brazilians. In the account of John Parish Robertson, the Banda Oriental fell into "the most unbridled disorder and horrible anarchy" and Artigas' name became "synonymous with bandit, murderer and thief"; this was the pretext now king John VI needed to once again invade the region in 1816. The new invasion, led by Carlos Frederico Lecor, was instigated and unopposed by Buenos Aires, who feared Artigas. The invading Luso-Brazilian forces repeatedly defeated Artigas and his men, with Lecor conquering Montevideo on 20 January 1817. Artigas still unsuccessfully tried to resist, being finally defeated at the battle of Tacuarembó in 1820; with no hopes of continuing the resistance, he went into exile in Paraguay, where he spent the rest of his life as a prisoner of Paraguayan dictator Rodríguez de Francia.
The local population was divided on the matter; many notable natives of the province, such as Fructuoso Rivera and Juan Antonio Lavalleja, joined Lecor against the Portuguese, while others, such as Manuel Oribe, sided with Portugal; the towns and villages of the countryside, such as Colônia do Sacramento, San José, Cerro Largo and Maldonado, had also joined the Brazilian cause. Thus, once the Portuguese were defeated and left to Lisbon, the Cisplatina province remained as part of the Empire of Brazil.
Following the United Province's recognition of Brazil's independence on 25 June 1823, the country immediately began diplomatic talks with the Empire regarding Cisplatina, which the Argentine government considered theirs and wanted to gain possession of. In 1823, the Argentines sent to the Brazilian court in Rio de Janeiro in order to negotiate a peaceful Brazilian withdrawal from the region. The Argentine diplomatic mission made a series of proposals and, after receiving no response from the Brazilian government, demanded a reply in February 1824. The answer was given on 6 February 1824, in which the Imperial government promptly rejected any negotiations regarding the cession of Cisplatina, concluding its note by declaring:
Emperor Pedro I of Brazil, who had been informed of the situation in Cisplatina by Lecor, believed the natives of the province wanted to remain as part of the Empire; however, Lecor had surrounded himself with people who were sympathetic to Brazil, which prevented him from knowing the true intentions of the province's inhabitants. Likewise, after the Brazilian patriots defeated the Portuguese and entered Montevideo, the locals swore the Brazilian Constitution on 10 May 1824, by which Cisplatina would become part of Brazil. This situation gave off the impression the inhabitants of the province wanted to be part of the Empire. In reality, however, this was not the case: apart from Montevideo and other small cities along the coast, all the countryside, where Artigas' influence was still strong, wished for independence, with the locals disguising their intentions.
On 19 April 1825, a group of 33 men known as the Treinta y Tres, or the Thirty-Three, led by Juan Antonio Lavalleja, left Buenos Aires, crossed the Uruguay River and landed on Agraciada Beach with arms and ammunition, starting the rebel movement against the Empire of Brazil; the action had Rivera's knowledge and collusion. After landing, Lavalleja and his men set out in search of recruits. The next day, the patriots, already numbering more than 200 men, marched to Soriano and defeated the small garrison there, which was commanded by , who joined them. People from every corner of the province began to take up arms and present themselves to the patriots. According to John Armitage, a foreign observer present at the time, the insurgents were few in number, but superior to their opponents when on horseback, also having "a perfect knowledge of the face of the country".
Upon learning of Rivera's defection, the Brazilian government sent two thousand men and a fleet under admiral Rodrigo Ferreira Lobo to the River Plate in July 1825 in order to request the Argentines to abstain from further aiding the rebels and to recall "their subjects", otherwise his imperial majesty would "repel force by force". The Argentine government replied that it had no part in the rebellion and that "the supplies furnished from Buenos Aires had been bought either with the money, or on the credit, of private individuals in the stores of the city, which were open to all alike, whether friends or enemies". Despite this, they were covertly supporting the rebels and, as time passed, it became increasingly apparent that the message was insincere. In Carranza's words, the insurgents' "crusade" was "generously supported by donations from Argentines and Orientals Uruguayans".
On 14 July, the Uruguayan patriots installed a provisional government in Florida, which was headed by Lavalleja. By now their numbers had increased considerably: Lavalleja, commander of the army, was at the head of 1,000 men. Rivera commanded an equal force in Durazno, while Manuel Oribe and Quirós commanded 300 men each. The Uruguayans then laid siege to Colonia del Sacramento and Montevideo. On 15 July, Brazilian colonel Vasco Antunes Maciel routed the besiegers at Colonia. Three days later, Oribe attacked Montevideo at night, but was repelled. On 17 August, a new battle took place near Colonia del Sacramento, when colonel João Ramos, at the head of 300 Brazilians, fought against 400 Uruguayans, who, after a fierce combat, retreated with considerable losses. On 22 August, Rivera attacked the town of Mercedes with 500 men, being repelled. According to David Carneiro, the patriots' goal was always to fight on open field due to the superiority of their cavalry, but, whenever that was not the case, or when they were not in large numerical advantage, they were defeated.
Once convinced by Bento Manuel to go on the offensive, Lecor devised a plan to defeat the patriots separately and ordered Bento Manuel to reconnoitre the countryside. Bento Manuel left Montevideo for Minas on 1 October with 1,150 cavalrymen in order to join forces with Bento Gonçalves and his 354 men. After the junction, they were to march towards Lavalleja and fight him before he could join forces with Rivera. The two Uruguayan leaders managed to join forces, however, and together they numbered more than 2,000 men. Bento Manuel reached Minas on 2 October and continued marching North until Barragán, where he met Bento Gonçalves on the 5th. After joining forces with Bento Gonçalves, the Brazilian commander set out in search of Rivera. On 11 October, Bento Manuel received news that Rivera was on the right bank of the Sarandí River and decided to launch a surprise attack.
The patriots, however, already aware of the Brazilian approach due to the observations made by Manuel Oribe, decided to gather all their troops and wait for the arrival of Bento Manuel. Arriving at Sarandí on 12 October, Bento Manuel, believing he had caught Rivera by surprise, found himself facing the entire Uruguayan force. The battle began in the morning with the first shots fired, but, greatly outnumbered, the Brazilians could not hold out for long, and their troops were completely scattered. The two Brazilian commanders gathered some of the dispersed troops and headed toward Polanco, being pursued by Rivera, but managed to escape after swimming across the Yi River. After the battle, the Uruguayans took the town of Mercedes, after the capitulation of the local Brazilian commander, and the towns of Salto and Paysandú, which had been abandoned by the Brazilians, who now only controlled the cities of Colonia del Sacramento and Montevideo, and the fortresses of Santa Teresa and São Miguel.
On the night of 20 October 1825, the population in Buenos Aires took to the streets and attacked the Brazilian consulate shouting death to the emperor of Brazil and insulting the Brazilian consul, to which the Argentine government refused to give any satisfaction. According to Argentine historian , the people and the press in Argentina "ardently clamored for the vindication of the usurped property". A few days later, on 28 October, Frota wrote his last report to the Brazilian government, declaring that the United Provinces' Congress had already decided on war. Fearing for his own safety, he left Buenos Aires and returned to Brazil.
The Argentine Congress proclaimed the Cisplatina province reintegrated into the United Provinces on 25 October 1825, declaring that it would help the insurgents against Brazil by all means; this decision was communicated to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Brazil by means of a note on 3 November. The following day, the Argentine government broke off diplomatic relations with Brazil, claiming that the Imperial Navy had engaged in acts of hostility in the River Plate. Faced with this situation, the Empire of Brazil then responded by formally declaring war on the United Provinces on 10 December 1825, with admiral Rodrigo Lobo declaring "all the ports of the Republic in a state of blockade" eleven days later, on 21 December. The United Provinces reciprocated on 1 December 1826. In order to effectively fight Brazil, the Argentine Congress then created the central executive power and elected Bernardino Rivadavia as the country's first president.
The first line units based in Rio Grande do Sul consisted of the 9th Battalion of Caçadores, and the 4th and 5th Cavalry Regiments, based in the cities of Porto Alegre, Jaguarão and Rio Pardo, respectively. The second line ones consisted of the 46th Battalion of Caçadores, spread across the province, and the 20th (Porto Alegre), 21st (Rio Grande), 22nd (Rio Pardo), 23rd (Alegrete), 24th and 25th (São Borja) Cavalry Regiments. The 25th Cavalry Regiment consisted only of Guarani indians. Recruitment was one of the main issues faced by the army. As early as 1823, members of the Constituent Assembly complained about the 'predatory' nature of recruitment, which amounted to a Blood tribute, threatening the country's economy and society. When the Brazilian Parliament met for the first time in 1826, it was a consensus among its members that recruitment needed to be reformed, but no concrete measures were taken, and so forced recruitment continued.
In Hélio Leôncio Martins' estimate, the Imperial Brazilian Navy was the strongest force Brazil could rely on, numbering a total of 121 ships including two ships of the line, Pedro I and Príncipe Real, 8 frigates, 7 corvettes, 1 lugger, 17 , 24 , 33 gunboats, and other vessels. Apart from these vessels, the Brazilian fleet also included merchant ones that had been armed and converted into warships. Its quality varied, however; the frigates were no older than eight years, but the corvettes and brigs included ships from the Napoleonic Wars, such as Itaparica, Liberal and Cacique, to new ones built in North America, such as Maria da Gloria and Maceió. The ships of the line, Pedro I and Príncipe Real, built in 1763 and 1771, respectively, were old and in poor condition, with the latter serving only as a prison ship while the former, despite still being in active service during the war, was in serious need of repairs.
Brazil's naval policy became the subject of criticism for the government's opposition, which were repeated by foreign observers. The former, wanting to harm the emperor's ministers, described the navy as a "naval police", saying that, instead of the large and heavy frigates bought by the government, it would have been better to acquire low draft schooners, better suited for navigation in the shallow waters of the River Plate. For John Armitage, the desire of "ostentation" and to show off an "exalted idea" of its naval power to foreign nations had led Brazil to purchase and build heavy vessels, unsuited for war in the River Plate. Armitage also opined that "swift-sailing vessels would not only have been more easily equipped, but also more appropriate to the actual exigencies of the country". This was also Gustavo Barroso's opinion, for whom the Brazilian fleet was "abundant, but inadequate", as its ships "were not suited to our people, our service and the war against our neighbours inside their home". In turn, Toscano argued that these criticisms were unjustified, remarking that, for a country like Brazil, with a large coast and sea trade routes to defend, having a balanced navy with both large and small vessels would be ideal; Toscano also pointed out that John Armitage's remarks were "accepted without criticism in its nominal value by many historians".
When the war broke out in December 1825, the Brazilian naval forces in the River Plate consisted of the frigate Tétis, the corvette Liberal, 2 brigs, a barque, 12 schooners, and 8 gunboats; the same fleet that, under the command of Pedro Nunes, had fought against the Portuguese during Brazil's independence war and also against Artigas in 1820. This squadron was promptly reinforced by two frigates, Imperatriz and Dona Paula, two corvettes, Itaparica and Maceió, one brig and other smaller vessels.
By the end of March the army numbered 2,800 men, well below the number anticipated by the government. According to Gabriel Di Meglio, the practice of capturing slaves for the army, which had been an important tool during the country's war of independence, "seems to have been somewhat more limited this time", as there was no slave trade in the country since 1812, and also due to the Free Womb law of 1813. Thus, new soldiers were mostly forced conscripts, who came from those deemed "vagrants" by the authorities. Harsh punishments were applied to deserters, such as floggings and even executions by firing squad. Lacking other effective means, the Argentine government intensified forced recruitment, especially in the province of Buenos Aires, where it had greater effective control.
Dissent among the Uruguayans and Argentines was also an issue, as Lavalleja refused to incorporate his forces into the Argentine Army or to submit to the orders of Martín Rodríguez. When the situation seemed to be heading toward an armed conflict, Lavalleja agreed to incorporate his forces into the National Army, at the same time that the Buenos Aires government replaced Martín Rodríguez with Carlos María de Alvear as the commander-in-chief of the republican forces. The army finally began to organize and, under Alvear's command, the troops spent three months in training and preparation. Likewise, the necessary equipment was gradually received and distributed among the soldiers. Thus, when they began marching again in September 1826, the republican forces numbered around 12,000 men, including the Oriental troops, most of which consisted of cavalry. The Argentine Congress changed the country's name from United Provinces to Argentine Republic, in line with the Unitarian project, and the army adopted the name "Republican Army".
According to Alexandre Boiteux, upon creating their navy, "the Argentines did so not only in accordance with their financial resources, but also with the hydrographic conditions of the theater of operations: robust medium-draft ships, sailboats, well equipped, easily manoeuvrable". In Carranza's view, the Argentine fleet consisted of "some materially weak vessels, but that became respectable and effective by the strong spirit of their crews".
The Argentines decided to launch a combined land and naval attack against Colonia del Sacramento. Numerous failed attempts took place from February to March 1826, with the attackers suffering considerable losses. Several skirmishes also followed throughout 1826, without major consequences for the outcome of the war, while the larger operations took place at sea. General Martín Rodríguez had left his camp on the banks of the Uruguay River and established himself in Durazno. Infighting between Rivera and Lavalleja led the former to rebel and the latter to hand over the government of the Banda Oriental to Joaquín Suárez. In order to avoid further problems, the Argentine government appointed general Carlos María de Alvear as the commander of the republican army on 14 August 1826. Alvear arrived at Durazno on 1 September, replacing Martín Rodríguez.
In the Brazilian side, Rosado's passive conduct prompted criticism and complaints, which led emperor Pedro I to decide to go personally to the theater of operations and replace him. The emperor appointed the 54-year old general Felisberto Caldeira Brant, the Marquess of Barbacena, as the new commander-in-chief of the imperial forces. Pedro I left Rio de Janeiro on 24 November 1826 aboard the ship Pedro I, taking with him 800 infantry soldiers, including troops from the 27th Battalion of Caçadores, consisting of German soldiers. He arrived in Porto Alegre on 6 December, bringing with him the German general Gustav Heinrich von Braun. Before meeting with the troops, however, the emperor decided to return to Rio de Janeiro. On 11 December empress Leopoldina died at the court, but the news of her death had not yet reached the emperor when he had already decided to return to Rio de Janeiro.
In turn, general Carlos María de Alvear was marching with the republican forces toward Bagé in order to prevent the junction of the two Brazilian commanders and defeat them separately, believing that the Brazilian forces would only grow over time. The Argentine commander issued a proclamation rallying his troops to fight, stating that "millions of Brazilians" were "reaching out to them". He believed the local population to be republican, but the inhabitants resisted the invasion. Alvear and Barbacena were seeking each other in order to engage in a decisive battle, methodically marching in search of a favorable battleground. The Argentines preferred the plains due to their superiority in cavalry, while the Brazilians favored the hills, given their superior infantry.
On 23 January, an Argentine cavalry vanguard brought the news that the Brazilians had begun their march toward the Argentines, which caused euphoria in the republican army. Barbacena was unaware of the whereabouts of the republicans and decided to dispatch a cavalry vanguard under the command of Sebastião Barreto to track the Argentine movements and provide cover for his own march. On 5 February, after weeks of marching, Barbacena and Brown managed to join forces on the banks of the Lexiguana River, frustrating Alvear's plans. The Argentine commander had arrived in Bagé on 26 January and left the city on the 30th after sacking it. Alvear then decided to march toward São Gabriel, being followed by Barbacena. Minor encounters between the vanguards of the two armies heightened the tension. On 13 February, colonel Bento Manuel’s forward detachment clashed with colonel Juan Lavalle's forces near Vacacai. Two days later, another clash took place between the forward detachments of Lucio Norberto Mansilla, chief of the Argentine General Staff, and Bento Manuel, in the vicinity of Umbu. The Brazilians already knew the Argentine position since 14 February and were eager to attack.
On 19 February, immediately after arriving at Passo do Rosário, Alvear ordered his forces to cross the nearby Santa Maria River. Barbacena hoped to attack the republicans while they were still crossing the river. The dangerous Argentine position caused widespread discontent among the troops, and Alvear was nearly removed from command. A council of republican commanders was gathered and decided to march back and occupy the nearby hills, where they would prepare for battle. On the morning of 20 February Barbacena sighted the republican forces near Passo do Rosário. He was determined to attack them, despite being outnumbered. 6,300 Brazilians were about to clash with 7,700 Argentines and Uruguayans.
The strategy of the two nations reflected their respective positions. The Brazilians immediately imposed a blockade on the Río de la Plata and the trade of Buenos Aires on 31 December 1825, while the Argentines attempted to defy the blockade using Brown's squadron while unleashing a swarm of privateers to attack Brazilian seaborne commerce in the South Atlantic from their bases at Ensenada and more distant Carmen de Patagones. The Argentines gained some notable successes—most notably by defeating the Brazilian flotilla on the Uruguay River at the Battle of Juncal and by beating off a Brazilian attack on Carmen de Patagones. But by 1828, the superior numbers of Brazil's blockading squadrons had effectively destroyed Brown's naval force at the Monte Santiago and was successfully strangling the trade of Buenos Aires and the government revenue it generated.
Rodrigo Lobo's initial declaration stated that "all of the ports of the republic" were in a state of blockade. It caused different reactions from foreign powers. The United States view on blockades had been expressed before the war had begun, when Condy Raguet, the U.S. consul in Rio de Janeiro, wrote an extensive note to the Brazilian court detailing his government's position after being notified of the blockade on 6 December. Likewise, the American consul in Buenos Aires, colonel John Forbes, protested and accused Brazil of conducting a "paper" blockade for breaking the requirements of presence and continuity, since Lobo's fleet had made frequent returns to Montevideo for long periods.
The Americans held the view that a blockading force should not only be near the ports, but also in sight. They also argued that Brazil could not legitimally claim to be blockading Patagonia's southern coast when a single corvette was present there. In May, admiral Lobo conceded and agreed to limit the blockade to the River Plate's estuary. The United Kingdom, on the other hand, accepted the Brazilian position. As a naval power itself, it was not in Britain's interests for blockades to be hampered by excessive rules. The British government ordered its diplomatic posts to observe the blockade and refused requests for intervention made by its nationals to the Foreign Office.
In May 1826, Rodrigo Lobo was replaced by admiral Pinto Guedes, who reinvigorated the blockade, causing an enormous increase in the number of vessels seized, which motivated protests from Britain, France and the United States. In November Raguet announced that the United States refused to accept the legality of the blockade; the French ambassador was also instructed not to recognize it, unless Brazil released all French prizes and paid an indemnity. Only Britain continued to recognize it. With foreign patience waning, the Brazilian government backed down: on 26 November 1826, Guedes was ordered only to seize neutral vessels that were attempting to run the blockade after individually warning each one of them. The changes to the blockade's rules made the risk worth taking, and so the number of vessels reaching Buenos Aires, most of which were American, increased. Disappointed with his government's decision, Guedes declared: "I feel not the least repugnance to act fairly to the subjects of His Britannic Majesty, but no-one is ignorant of the mischief which citizens of the United States have done by taking advantage of the obstructions placed in the way of this squadron".
Given the high cost of the war for both sides and the threat it posed to trade between the United Provinces and the United Kingdom, the latter pressed the two belligerent parties to engage in peace negotiations in Rio de Janeiro. Under British mediation, the United Provinces and the Empire of Brazil signed the 1828 Treaty of Montevideo, which acknowledged the independence of Cisplatina under the name Uruguay.
The treaty also granted Brazil sovereignty over the eastern section of the former Eastern Jesuit Missions and, most importantly, guaranteed free navigation of the Río de la Plata, a central national security issue for the Brazilians.
The war has a similar reception within Argentina, considered as a brave fight against an enemy of superior forces. The Argentine Navy has named many ships after people, events and ships involved in the war. William Brown (known as "Guillermo Brown" in Argentina) is considered the father of the Argentine navy,. Used mainly in Argentina but also in other countries like the United Kingdom, see e.g. this BBC report. URL accessed on October 15, 2006. or Almirante Brown, see e.g. his biography at Planeta Sedna. URL accessed on October 15, 2006., see report at County Mayo's official website. URL accessed on October 15, 2006., according to its official website. URL accessed on October 15, 2006. and is treated akin to an epic hero for his actions in the war. He is also known as the "Nelson of the Río de la Plata".
Brazil has had little interest in the war beyond naval warfare buffs. Few Brazilian historians have examined it in detail. The national heroes of Brazil are instead from Brazilian independence, the conflicts with Rosas (Platine War) or the Paraguayan War.
Despite the role of Britain in the war, and the presence of British naval officials on both sides of the conflict, the war is largely unknown in the English-speaking world.
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